DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN PROPER AND IMPROPER PROSELYTISM: THE RIGHT TO ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE ONE’S NEIGHBOR IN EUROPE by Haertel, Leticia Machado
91DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN PROPER AND IMPROPER PROSELYTISM: 
THE RIGHT TO ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE ONE’S NEIGHBOR IN EUROPE
Revista DIREITO UFMS | Campo Grande, MS | v.3 | n.1 | p. 91 - 107 | jan./jul. 2017
DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN PROPER AND 
IMPROPER PROSELYTISM: THE RIGHT TO ATTEMPT 
TO CONVINCE ONE’S NEIGHBOR IN EUROPE
TRAÇANDO A LINHA ENTRE PROSELITISMO 
PRÓPRIO E IMPRÓPRIO: O DIREITO DE TENTAR 
CONVENCER O PRÓXIMO NA EUROPA
Letícia Machado Haertel
Graduanda em Direito na Universidade de São Paulo – USP
Submissão em 03/04/2017
Aprovação em 14/06/2017
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21671/rdufms.v3i1.3305
Abstract: This paper analyzes the legality of restrictions to the practice of proselytism, the attempt to 
convert people to one’s own religion. This issue has caused great controversy during the preparation 
of human rights instruments and national laws – especially considering that some religions do not 
accept the right to change one’s religion while others have the duty to proselytize as one of their most 
sacred tenets. As the clashes between different cultures and religions gradually increase in the twenty-
first century, international courts have an important role in establishing limits to such practices so 
that people and States can properly regulate their conduct. The approach adopted by the author to 
analyse the legality of proselitism and of its restrictions was the examination of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (ECHR) jurisprudence, alongside bibliographic and documentary research aiming to 
investigate and explain the criteria adopted to restrict such right. The choice of the ECHR is based on 
the fact that such Court has a vast jurisprudence on the matter, contrary to other international human 
rights courts. Each paradigmatic case provides some criteria that, if put together, allow the setting of 
a framework on the legality of State restrictions to proselitism – even though the Court never clearly 
established such a framework. After deriving the criteria for the restriction from the decisions, this 
article concludes that the validity of its restrictions depends upon diverse circumstantial variables 
primarily relating to the potential for coercion of the message’s receiver. Some aspects regarding the 
limitations to the right to proselytize, however, remain unanswered. 
Keywords: Proselytism; European Court of Human Rights; Freedom of Religion; Limitations to 
rights. 
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Resumo: O presente artigo analisa a legalidade de restrições à pratica do proselitismo, a tentativa 
de converter pessoas a sua própria religião. Este assunto causou controvérsia durante a redação de 
diversos tratados de direitos humanos e leis nacionais – especialmente considerando que algumas 
religiões não aceitam a existência de um direito de mudar de religião, enquanto outras pregam o de-
ver de converter outros como um de seus dogmas mais sagrados. Considerando que os choques entre 
culturas e religiões diferentes aumentam gradualmente no século vinte e um, as cortes internacionais 
têm um papel importante em estabelecer os limites a tais práticas para que pessoas e Estados possam 
regular sua conduta propriamente. O artigo visa clarificar os limites estabelecidos até hoje e facilitar 
tal regulação. A abordagem adotada pela autora para analisar a legalidade do proselitismo e de suas 
restrições foi realizada mediante exame da jurisprudência da Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos 
(CtEDH), acompanhada de pesquisa bibliográfica e documental com o objetivo de investigar e expli-
car os critérios utilizados para restringir tal direito. A escolha da CtEDH pela autora justifica-se no 
fato de que esta possui uma vasta jurisprudência no assunto, ao contrário de outras cortes internacio-
nais de direitos humanos. Cada caso paradigmático fornece alguns critérios que, se colocados juntos, 
permitem a criação de um quadro sobre a legalidade de restrições estatais ao proselitismo – mesmo 
considerando que a Corte nunca traçou claramente tal quadro. A partir da derivação dos critérios 
para tal restrição, conclui-se que a permissibildiade de restrições ao direito de proselitizar depende 
de diversas variáveis circunstanciais primariamente relacionadas com o potencial de coerção do re-
ceptor da mensagem. Outros aspectos relacionados a limitação do direito de proselitizar, contudo, 
continuam sem resposta.
Palavras-chave: Proselitismo; Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos; Liberdade religiosa; Restrições 
a direitos.
SUMMARY: Introduction. 1. Kokkinakis v. Greece: a framework’s sketch. 1.1. The 
Facts. 1.2. The right to try to convince one’s neighbor in the European Conven-
tion. 1.3. The Court’s decision through the application of the three step test on 
the limitation of rights. 2. Larissis and others v. Greece: the consolidation of (mi-
litary) authority as a key factor. 2.1. The military. 2.2. The Civilians. 3. United 
Christian Broadcasters Ltd. v. UK and subsequent progress: religiously neutral 
prohibitions on proselytism. 4. Religious symbols and the “Proselytising Effect” 
at educational institutions. 4.1. Proselytism at educational institutions. 4.2. The 
“Proselytising effect”. 4.3. The passive symbol. 5. An exception: Familiar Prosely-
tism. Conclusion. References. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, it is an international consensus that the right to freedom of 
religion includes the right to change one’s religion.1 However, those changes 
1 Several international treaties recognize such a right. See, inter alia, UN General Assembly, Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), Article 18; UN General Assembly, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 999, p. 171, Article 18; Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 
1950, Article 9; Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, 
“Pact of San Jose”, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969, Article 12; Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Banjul Charter”), 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 
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will not always merely be the consequence of personal intellectual or emotional 
causes: sometimes external factors such as the activities of persons, churches or 
institutions will be of great weight, if not decisive (LERNER, 1998).
The first case concerning freedom of religion to have come before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) discussed the issue of proselytism2, 
the right to attempt to change one’s religion. This right involves more than the 
common conflict between Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Expression: it 
leads to a clash between aspects within the scope of the same right, as freedom 
of religion encompasses both the freedom to legitimately disseminate religious 
views (LERNER, 1998) and the right to be protected against religious coercion 
(HRCEE, 1994).
Such controversies are aggravated by the fact that what constitutes the 
sacred duty of evangelization for one group may be viewed by another as 
improper proselytizing (ROBECK, 1996). This happens due to the fact that while 
some creeds require its adherents to attempt to bring others to their faith3 
(KRISHNASWAMI, 1960), such activity may be highly offensive to people with 
a different belief (AN-NA’IM, 1996). In this sense, the term “proselytism” has, in 
many contexts, a decisive negative connotation.
As used in this article, proselytism means bearing witness to a religion 
(ECHR, 1993), a definition that avoids the notion of per se improper conduct. 
The objective of this article is the determination of what its limits are within the 
framework of the European Convention of Human Rights, which determination 
is critical to the achievement of greater toleration and pluralism.  For that, a 
throughout study of the ECHR’s jurisprudence, alongside a doctrinal analysis, 
will be performed. 
2. KOKKINAKIS V. GREECE: A FRAMEWORK’S SKETCH
2.1 THE FACTS
The Kokkinakis v. Greece case (1993) was the first decision by international 
courts on the issue of change of religion. The Applicant, Mr. Kokkinakis, was a 
Jehovah’s Witness arrested more than sixty times for proselyting in Greece. 
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), Article 8.2 Judge Pettiti mentions on his Partly Concurring Opinion in Kokkinakis v. Greece that it “is the first 
real case concerning freedom of religion to have come before the European Court since it was set 
up” (ECDH, 1993). 
3 This can be seen, for example, in the Bible: “Go (...) and make disciples of all nations, baptizing 
them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey 
everything that I have commanded you” (Matthew 28:19,20).
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While in freedom, he and his wife called at Mrs. Kyriakaki’s home and engaged 
in a religious discussion with her. Her husband, a cantor at an Orthodox Church, 
informed the police and the Kokkinakis were arrested. They were found guilty 
for attempting 
[…] to proselytize (…) by taking advantage of their inexperience, their 
low intellect and their naivety. In particular, they went to the home of 
Mrs. Kyriakaki (…) and told her they brought good news; by insisting 
in a pressing manner they gained admittance to the house and began to 
read a book from the Scriptures (…) encouraging her by means of their 
judicious, skillful explanations (…) to change her Orthodox Christian 
beliefs.
This was the Court’s understanding - even though Mrs. Kyriakaki clearly 
expressed that the discussion did not influence her beliefs. The Greek law 
prohibits proselytism,4 understanding it as 
in particular, any direct or indirect attempt to intrude on the religious 
beliefs of a person of a different religious persuasion, with the aim of 
undermining those beliefs, either by any kind of inducement or promise 
of moral support or material assistance, or by fraudulent means or by 
taking advantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low intellect or naivety 
(GREECE, 1939, article 2).
It also establishes that “the commission of such an offence in a school or 
other educational establishment or a philanthropic institution shall constitute a 
particularly aggravating circumstance” (GREECE, 1939, article 3).
2.2 THE RIGHT TO TRY TO CONVINCE ONE’S NEIGHBOUR IN THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) 
encompasses the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, 
to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance [emphasis added].
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only 
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection 
4 Especifically, Article 13(2) of The Constitution of Greece,  18 April 2001, available at: http://www.
hri.org/docs/syntagma/artcl25.html#A13, accessed on 03.02.2017.
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of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.
Although the Convention does not explicitly state that there is a right to 
disseminate one’s religion5, the Court begins its ruling in Kokkinakis by stating 
that, without the right to try to convince one’s neighbour through teaching, the 
right to change one’s religion or belief would be a dead letter. Nevertheless, in 
democratic societies, it may be necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in 
order to reconcile the interest of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s 
beliefs are respected (EDGE, 1998). As in Article 9(2), those limitations need to 
comply with a three-step test, composed by three questions: (i) is the restriction 
prescribed by law? (ii) does it pursue legitimate aims? and (iii) is it necessary in 
a democratic society? 
2.3 THE COURT’S DECISION THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF THE 
THREE STEP TEST ON THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS
Preliminarily, it is important to highlight that the Court jumped directly to 
the application of the three step test without analysing if improper proselytism 
is a form of manifestation protected by article 9(1). The legitimacy of a right’s 
restriction under 9(2) is only at issue when that right is protected by the 
Convention. An alternative way of procedure could have been to ask whether the 
act of proselytism in question was a legitimate exercise of the right to manifest 
one’s religion or belief.6
The Court first proceeds to the analysis of the Greek legislature forbidding 
proselytism and states that it is compatible with international standards and 
that the criteria adopted by it are reconcilable with the Court’s criteria for 
distinguishing “bearing Christian witness” from “improper proselytism”: While 
the former corresponds to an essential mission and a responsibility of every 
Christian, the latter represents a deformation of it. It may take the form of activities 
offering material or social advantages with a view to gaining new members for 
a Church or exerting improper pressure on people in distress or in need. It may 
even entail the use of violence or brainwashing, thus being incompatible with 
respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of others. Therefore, 
5 In opposition to the American Convention, which explicitly states that there is a right to disseminate 
one’s religion. See Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, 
“Pact of San Jose”, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969, Article 12. Available at: http://www.cidh.oas.
org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.htm., accessed on 03.02.2017.
6 This was only done by the Court in 2013, in Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, nos. 26261/05 
and 26377/06, 14 March 2013, available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-117127, 
accessed on 03.02.2017. An analysis of this practice in Kokkinakis can be found in Evans (2001).
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the Court understood that the prohibition of the Greek law was only applicable 
to what was understood as improper proselytism, which can be restricted under 
9(2). 
It must be highlighted that the Court’s definition does not embrace all aspects 
included in the Greek legislation. However, as the law was explicitly considered 
an adequate way of curbing improper proselytism, its elements will be added 
to the courts understanding for the purposes of this paper.7 The definition 
presented by the Greek law and the acquiescence by the Court are questionable 
for two main reasons: its haziness and its criminal character, whose combination 
is particularly dangerous.
The usage of the wording “any direct or indirect attempt” by the Greek law is 
questionable, seen that it provides a blanket prohibition on the right to proselytize, 
as noticed and criticized by some Judges in Court.8 Moreover, the term “by taking 
advantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low intellect or naivety” found in the 
law allows the state to arrogate to itself the right to asses a person’s weakness in 
order to punish a proselytizer, which can lead to authoritarian interference. It is 
known that the Court reiterates on its jurisprudence that the wording of many 
statues must not be absolutely precise,9 but the Court also frequently considers 
that a law can only fulfill the foreseeability criteria “if formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable any individual to regulate his conduct”.10 
The haziness of the law is aggravated by its criminal sanctions. Even though 
other international courts demand the usage of restrictive and univocal terms in 
the formulation of criminal law,11 the Court seems to ignore that the Greek law 
virtually implies a criminal sanction for lawful forms of expression. It may be 
7 Understanding what the Court meant by accepting the Greek definition on proselytism is 
particularly troublesome seen that it also took into consideration the previous decisions from 
Greek Courts to define proselytism. A criticism of this approach can be found in Gunn (1996).8 See, for example, Judge Pettiti on his Partly Concurring Opinion and Judge Valticos on his Dissenting 
Opinion in the Kokkinakis v. Greece case, judged by EDCH, on the 25th of May of 1993.
9 See, inter alia, The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 2), 26 November 1991, Series A no. 
217, available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57583, accessed on 03.02.2017.10 In Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey (no. 3111/10, ECHR 2012, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-115705, accessed on 03.02.2017), a law was considered inappropriate for resulting in 
a virtually unlimited interference on Freedom of Expression while not considering the collateral 
effects of restricting a large quantity of information. Therefore, the Greek law should have been 
considered inappropriate for producing arbitrary effects as the Turkish law was.11 The IACtHR notably did so in Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru (IACrtHR, 30 May 1999 §121, available 
at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_52_ing.pdf, accessed on 03.02.2017); 
Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru, (IACrtHR, 25 November 2004 §125, available at http://www.corteidh.
or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_119_ing.pdf, accessed on 03.04.2017); Ricardo Canese v. 
Paraguai, (IACrtHR, 31 August 2004 §124, available at http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
seriec_111_ing.pdf, accessed on 03.04.2017) amongst other cases.
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asked whether the very principle of applying a criminal statute to proselytism 
is compatible with Article 9 of the Convention (PASQUALUCCI, 2006). Criminal 
sanctions provide an excessive burden to the proselytisers, especially the ones 
belonging to religious minorities.12 
Despite the fact that it should have forestalled the analysis in the first 
prong as the national law was not adequately prescribed, the Court continued 
its analysis and found that no issues arose under the legitimacy of the aims 
pursued. However, it finally finds a violation of Article 9 on the grounds that 
the State’s actions were not justified in the circumstances by a pressing social 
need. The Greek Courts have established the Applicant’s liability by merely 
reproducing the wording of the law and did not specify how the accused had 
used improper means. According to the ECHR, “none of the evidence shows that 
Georgia Kyriakaki (…) was particularly inexperienced in Orthodox Christian 
doctrine, being married to a cantor, or of particularly low intellect or naivety”. 
Therefore, the Court ended up doing exactly what Judge Pettiti criticized on 
his vote and assessed Mr. Kokkinaki’s proselytism based on Ms. Kyriakaki’s 
mentality while deciding one of the most polemic cases on its history.13 Its 
understandings on this case are still applied, as it could be observed in the 
case Jeowah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia (2010), which bears considerable 
similarities with the Kokkinakis case.  
3. LARISSIS AND OTHERS V. GREECE: THE CONSOLIDATION OF 
(MILITARY) AUTHORITY AS A KEY FACTOR 
Judge Pettiti highlighted the importance of expanding the Court’s unders-
tanding on improper proselytism in Kokkinakis. An opportunity for this arose in 
1988, when the case Larissis v. Greece was brought to the Court. The Applicants 
were officers in the Greek Air Force and followers of the Pentecostal Church, whi-
ch adheres to the principle that it is the duty of all believers to engage in prosely-
tism. They allegedly tried to convert three men: Mr. Antoniadis, Mr. Kokkalis and 
Mr. Kafkas. Mr. Antoniadis affirmed that he felt obliged to take part in religious 
discussions promoted by the Applicants considering that they were his superior 
officers. Very differently, Mr. Kokkalis was not under direct command of any of 
them. Regarding Mr. Kafkas, no Applicant ever approached him. Some civilians 
12 Concern expressed by Judge Pettiti on his Partly Concurring Opinion and Judge Martens on his 
Partly Dissenting Opinion in Kokkinakis. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57827, 
accessed on 04.01.2017.
13 Lerner (1998) points out that the division of the nine-judge Chamber and the criticism by legal 
commentators reflects and underscores the controversial nature of the case.
98 LETÍCIA MACHADO HAERTEL
Revista DIREITO UFMS | Campo Grande, MS | v.3 | n.1 | p. 91 - 107 | jan./jul. 2017
also complained about the Applicants’ proselytizing activities. The Greek courts 
classified all aforementioned acts as improper proselytism.
3.1 THE MILITARY 
The Court joined its judgment in Kokkinakis with its understandings of the 
military life, by stating that: 
The Court notes that the hierarchical structures which are a feature of 
life in the armed forces may colour every aspect of the relations between 
military personnel, making it difficult for a subordinate to rebuff the 
approaches of an individual of superior rank or to withdraw from a 
conversation initiated by him. Thus, what would in the civilian world 
be seen as an innocuous exchange of ideas which the recipient is free to 
accept or reject, may, within the confines of military life, be viewed as 
a form of harassment or the application of undue pressure in abuse of 
power. (ECHR, 1988) 
Aiming to avoid the risks that the superior-subordinate relationship can 
degenerate, the Court understood that, even if pressure is not consciously applied, 
any restriction to proselytism is justified. Thus being, all actions performed by the 
Applicants (including reading the Bible, polite encouragement, tenet explaining, 
questioning, criticism of other religions, delivery of papers) are, in the military 
context, improper proselytism.
The Court also found that “even Kafka, who said that was not coerced, must 
have felt to a certain extent constrained, perhaps obliged to enter into religious 
discussions with the Applicants, and possibly even to convert to the Pentecostal 
faith” (ECHR, 1988), thus proving that the target’s opinion is irrelevant to assess 
proselytism. The Court attempts to disclaim its understanding by stating that “not 
every discussion about religion or other sensitive matters between individuals of 
unequal rank will fall within this category” (ECHR, 1988), but leaving unanswered 
what those permissible situations would be. 
3.2 THE CIVILIANS
With specific regard to the complaining civilians, none of the evidence 
indicates that they felt obliged to listen to the Applicants or that their behavior 
was improper in any way because they are not linked by any superior-subordinate 
relationship. The Court stated that the civilians whom they attempted to convert 
were not subject to pressures and constraints of the same kind as the airmen, 
even though “the prestige of the officers’ uniform may have had an effect even on 
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civilians”.14 This shows that only a very high degree of social authority could imply 
in the same “improper pressure” verifiable within the military environment.
It is important to highlight one specific civilian, Mrs. Zounara. Although 
she was in an “extreme state of distress” during her conversations with the 
Airmen, the Court did not find it established that her mental condition was such 
that she was in need of any special protection from the evangelical activities 
of the Applicants or that they applied improper pressure on her. Therefore, it 
remains unclear the reason why Ms. Kyriakaki’s mental condition was an issue in 
Kokkinakis while Ms. Zounara’s, which was considerably worse, was not. 
4. UNITED CHRISTIAN BROADCASTERS LTD V. UK AND SUBSEQUENT 
PROGRESS: RELIGIOUSLY NEUTRAL PROHIBITIONS ON PROSELYTISM
In United Christian Broadcasters Ltd v. UK (2000), the ECHR found that 
prohibiting all religious bodies, regardless of their beliefs, from applying for a 
national radio license is not a violation of Article 10. Although this case was ruled 
on Freedom of Expression and lacks the word “proselytism”, it fits the Court’s 
definition and matters to our analysis. The Applicant was a charitable company 
whose aim is to promote religious broadcasting in the UK, thus intending to 
promote proselytism on the radio. By deciding favorably to the law that forbids 
any licensing to bodies with religious nature, the Court defined that proper 
proselytism can be completely prohibited if this prohibition is done in a non-
discriminatory way. 
This understanding was further developed in Murphy v. Ireland (2003)15,  in 
which the Court stated that even the most innocuous16 text, such as an event’s 
announcement17, can be forbidden by a neutral law. It is important to highlight 
that even facially neutral laws may entail discriminatory effects (ECHR, 2014).
14 This concern was expressed by Judge Valticos on his Partly Dissenting Opinion joined by Judge 
Morenilla in Larissis. Available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58139, accessed on 
03.04.2017.
15 The case has some substantial differences, such as the fact that the Applicant could have otherwise 
advanced his views both orally and in writing, in the print media and in public assembly. He could 
also have appeared on radio and television and have transmitted the video by satellite and other 
means. However, this does not affect this analysis. 
16 This adjective was even used by the Government when it agreed that “the advertisement appeared 
innocuous and that it was to some extent simply informational”. 17 The advertisement curbed by the law has the following message: “What think ye of Christ? Would 
you, like Peter, only say that he is the son of the living God? Have you ever exposed yourself to the 
historical facts about Christ? The Irish Faith Centre are presenting for Easter week an hour long 
video by Dr Jean Scott Phd on the evidence of the resurrection from Monday 10th - Saturday 15th 
April every night at 8.30 and Easter Sunday at 11.30am and also live by satellite at 7.30pm.”
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5. RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AND THE “PROSELYTISING EFFECT” AT 
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
5.1 PROSELYTISM AT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
In cases as Folgerø and others v. Norway (2007) and Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. 
Turkey (2007), any proselytism at schools was considered misplaced proselytism.18 
The Court considered that educational institutions should not be an arena for 
preaching or missionary activities, but a meeting place for different religious and 
philosophical convictions where pupils could gain neutral knowledge about their 
respective thoughts and traditions in consonance with Article 2 of Protocol nº1 to 
the European Convention (A2P1). According to it, the students also have the right 
to be exempted from any slightly non neutral form of education:
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any 
functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, 
the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education 
and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions.
The neutrality guaranteed by the A2P1 is not limited to the school curriculum, 
but also extends to “the school environment”. As primary and secondary 
schooling are compulsory, the State should not impose on pupils, against their 
will and without their being able to extract themselves, the symbol of a religion 
with which they do not identify (ECHR, 2009). In doing so, the respondent 
Government violated A2P1 and Article 9 of the Convention.
5.2 THE “PROSELYTIZING EFFECT”
The Court made an equivalence in Dahlab v. Switzerland (2001) between 
bearing oral witness and other religiously motivated actions. Therefore, it 
understood that the mere act of wearing an Islamic headscarf can be considered 
proselytism for generating a so called “proselytizing effect”. This finding 
is reflected by the facts of the case: a teacher was prohibited from wearing a 
headscarf while teaching because it would interfere with the religious beliefs of 
her pupils. 
The Court understood that the measure was legitimate because, as school 
teachers are both participants in the exercise of educational authority and 
18 This term was firstly mentioned in 1976, when the Court heard the complaints of parents with 
strong Christian beliefs about compulsory sex education in Danish State Schools. However, the 
concept is not developed and the Court decided that the sex education lessons did not amount to 
indoctrination. See Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 7 December 1976, Series A no. 
23, available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57509, accessed on 03.05.2017.
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representatives of the state, the State aimed to ensure its educational system’s 
neutrality (and ultimately the neutrality of the State itself). Therefore, it held that 
[even though] it is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful 
external symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf may have on the 
freedom of conscience and religion of very young children, (…) it cannot 
be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind 
of proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women 
by a precept which is laid down in the Koran. 
This case seems to outgrow the Court’s understanding in Larissis and 
establishes that the sense of authority and the role-model perception can lead 
to improper pressure even between civilians. However, this justification does not 
apply, inter alia,19 to the Leyla Şahin v. Turkey case, to which the Court provided 
the same decision. Ms. Şahin was a student at a university and, as pointed 
out by Judge Tulkens (ECHR, 2004)20, did not have the same influence in the 
school environment as a teacher so that the Islamic headscarf did not generate 
a proselytizing effect in the classroom. It was not worn as an ostentatious or 
aggressive measure to exert pressure, provoke a reaction or spread propaganda 
that could hurt the beliefs of others. Also, she was surrounded by adults, and not 
children, as Ms. Dahlab was.  
This decision makes it unclear whether the authority of the teacher and 
the naivety of the children were really the key factors on which the Court based 
its understanding in Dahlab and Şahin. The motivations behind those cases are 
further obscured in Lautsi v. Italy (2009).
5.3 THE PASSIVE SYMBOL 
In Lautsi v. Italy (2009), the ECHR ruled that the requirement in Italian 
law stating that crucifixes should be displayed in classrooms does not violate 
the European Convention. It states that there is no evidence that the display of 
a religious symbol on classroom walls may have an influence on pupils whose 
convictions are still in the process of being formed. In other words, to have a visible 
crucifix in a classroom was not enough to denote a process of indoctrination.
19 Compare with Köse v. Turkey (dec.), no. 26625/02, ECHR 2006-II, available at: http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-102151, accessed on 03.06.2017; Kervanci v. France, no. 31645/04, 4 December 
2008, available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90048, accessed on 03.06.2017; Aktas v. 
France (dec.) no. 43563/08, 30 June 2009, available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61055, 
accessed on 03.06.2017; and Ranjit Singh v. France (dec.) no. 27561/08, 30 June 2009, available at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61055, accessed on 03.06.2017. 20 See Judge Tulkens’ Dissenting Opinion on Leyla Şahin, available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-70956, accessed on 03.06.2017. 
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The Court argued that a crucifix on a wall is essentially a passive symbol 
which implicitly does not affect the forum internum of the children, who would 
remain free to “believe or not believe”. It cannot be compared to the influence 
on pupils comparable to the one held by teachers, which would differentiate the 
Lautsi from the Dahlab case. However, the contradiction with Şahin is evident. 
The presence of crucifixes in schools is capable of infringing religious freedom 
and schoolchildren’s right to education to a greater degree than religious apparel 
that a teacher might wear. In the latter example, the teacher in question may 
invoke her own freedom of religion, which the State must also respect. The public 
authorities cannot, however, invoke such a right.21 
As the Court ignored this while analyzing Lautsi (2009), it appeared to 
have evolved its Dahlab (2001) understanding and that having passive religious 
symbols within the classroom would now be allowed. This impression was 
proved wrong in 2014, when the Court reiterated its ruling on Muslim garment in 
S.A.S. v. France (2014).22 This practice denotes a double standard whose analysis 
is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
6. AN EXCEPTION: FAMILIAR PROSELYTISM
In all of its cases on proselytism, the Court pointed to the importance of 
protecting the recipient’s psychological health from the purported stress exerted 
by any authority perception during a proselytizing act. An exception to this 
principle could be observed in Vojnity v. Hungary (2013), which ruled on a parent’s 
right to try to attempt to convince his child to adopt his religion. The standard for 
this situation to substantiate a risk of actual harm is very high, and mere unease, 
discomfort or embarrassment which the child may have experienced on account 
of his father’s attempts to transmit his religious beliefs are not enough to amount 
to improper proselytism. Therefore, the Court considered it unreasonable to 
separate a child from his father only due to the latter’s proselytizing attempts 
seen that providing religious education is the parents’ right. 
CONCLUSION
In considering the European Court’s cases on proselytism presented 
throughout this paper, it is possible to observe the outlines of an emerging 
21 See Judge Malinverni’s Dissenting Opinion joined by Judge Kalaydjieva in Lautsi, available at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104040, accessed on 03.06.2017.22 In this case, the Court ruled that the French ban on face covering did not violate ECHR’s provisions 
on right to privacy or freedom of religion.
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framework. As every individual should be able to make a free and unrestrained 
choice on religious matters, the benchmark of this framework is the notion of 
coercion. This notion demands the analysis of four variables in order to draw 
the line between proper and improper proselytism23: The existence of any form 
of violence or threats (1); the possibility of abandoning the interaction (2); the 
characteristics of the recipient (3); and the characteristics of the message (4).
When it comes to the existence of any form of violence or threats (1), the 
more proselytism interferes with that ability to freely choose, the more improper 
the act is. Coercion exists in a variety of forms, but committing violent acts or 
threatening anyone with it is the most direct one. There was no case so far in the 
European Court in which the source acted violently towards the target, but this 
criteria is clearly stablished in Kokkinakis24 and further reiterated.
It is also important to analyse the possibility of the listeners to abandon the 
interaction (2). In case of a so called “captive audience” – when simply leaving the 
speaker is not possible – even an apparently harmless speech becomes a form 
of coercion and improper proselytism. This happens when the target is either 
unable to leave a determined place or there is a good incentive to be in a good 
relation to the source (STAHNKE, 1999). Therefore, the confinement might take 
physical and psychological forms, being, in most cases, an association of them. 
In Larrissis, it was stablished that almost25 any form of proselytism is 
improper in the military environment basically because the hierarchical relation 
is such that the target may not be able to exercise free choice in accepting or 
resisting the change in beliefs proffered by an hierarchically superior source. 
However, the authority constant in the military environment cannot be observed 
in the relationship between militaries and civilians and hardly amounts to 
improper proselytism.
A midterm on the notion of authority is observed in the educational 
environment due to its mandatory character. For the Court, any proselytism in 
schools can be considered misplaced proselytism26 in any of the following three 
23 For a similar analysis regarding the United Nations framework, see Stahnke (1999).
24 Kokkinakis v. Greece, §48, 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260-A, available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-57827, accessed on 04.01.2017.
25 The usage of the word “almost” derives from the following unclear paragraph of Larissis: “not 
every discussion about religion or other sensitive matters between individuals of unequal rank 
will fall within this category”. See Larissis and Others v. Greece §51, 24 February 1998, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 1998, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58139, accessed 
on 03.04.2017.
26 Folgerø and Others v. Norway [GC], no. 15472/02, ECHR 2007-III, available at: http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-81356, accessed on 03.05.2017.
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forms: through curriculum, teaching and the environment. In Folgerø, the Court 
held that the school curriculum imposed on students needs to be religiously 
neutral or it would amount to a State’s authoritarian indoctrination on children. 
In Dahlab, the Court stablished that due to a teacher’s authority and the role-
model perception, she should not be allowed to wear her Muslim headscarf, 
which would present a “proselytizing effect” towards children and influence on 
their beliefs.
This “effect” becomes controversial when it comes to the educational 
environment. In Leyla Şahin, the Court held that even when a student wears a 
headscarf amongst peers, it is still a form of improper and misplaced proselytism. 
The “proselytising effect” arises from the fact that the headscarf appears to be 
imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran. However, in 
Lautsi, the Court argued that the mandatory display of crucifixes in classrooms 
was not a violation of the environment’s neutrality seen that it is a passive symbol. 
As many scholars have observed, the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Lautsi 
stands in tension with the court’s judgment in Islamic garments cases (BHUTA, 
2014) (DANCHIN, 2011). As it would confirm again in S.A.S., the court thus 
construes the usage of religious symbols as an act of proselytizing when a Muslim 
headscarf is worn in a public school or university but not when the state itself 
officially adopts a Christian religious symbol in its public schools (MAHMOOD; 
DANCHIN, 2014). Therefore, the European jurisprudence is inconclusive when it 
comes to the improperness of the “proselytizing effect”. 
It is also important to highlight that the naturally coercive relationship 
between parents and children is left untouched seen that they have the right to 
educate them according to their beliefs.
While analysing proselytism, it is also important to look at the characteristics 
of its target (3). Someone may be more susceptive to improper pressure when it 
is on distress or need, as presented in Kokkinakis. The amount of distress needed 
to cause improper pressure was yet not established by the Court, as observed in 
Larissis. 
However, the target’s perception seems to be irrelevant for the Court to 
analyse the properness of some act. Even though Mr. Kafkas affirmed in Larissis 
that he was not coerced by the source’s discourse, the ECHR considered that they 
he was submitted to improper pressure.
Even when there is no violence, no threats, no obligation on the interaction 
and no significant vulnerability on the recipient, the proselytising act may be 
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improper due to some characteristics on the message (4).27 However, as was 
estabilished in Christians and in Murphy, when the State’s prohibition is neutral, 
this criteria does not need to be analysed. 
The message can amount to improper pressure when it offers material and 
social benefits, or even happens within philanthropic institutions or hospitals 
(implicit content). The same happens when there are fraudulent methods implied 
on its contexts, such as lies or false pretexts. Some examples of normally allowed 
messages mentioned in Larissis are to read the Bible, polite encouragement, 
tenet explaining or questioning and delivery of papers.
This paper concludes that freedom of choice is a paramount consideration 
in order to draw the line between proper and improper proselytism. States 
must consider these criteria in order to establish a decision-making framework 
consistent with the principles of tolerance and respect. 
However, some issues regarding the school environment and the source’s 
characteristics remain unanswered and the Court is still unable to make explicit 
its interpretation of proselytism in relation to freedom of religion under Article 
9.28 Therefore, this study urges the Court towards clearer standards so that 
people can regulate their conduct, and the State, its restrictions.
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